WASHINGTON — The questions came in the form of an email on Dec. 1, 2018, to Boeing from the chief pilot at Ethiopian Airlines. They were detailed and filled with aviation jargon. One of them was 452 words.
But in essence the pilot was asking for direction. If we see a series of warnings on the new 737 Max, he posed, what do we do?
What ensued was an email conversation among a number of Boeing senior officials about whether they could answer the pilot’s questions without violating international restrictions on disseminating information about a crash while it was still under investigation.
That restriction was in play because a 737 Max flown by Lion Air had crashed a few weeks earlier leaving Indonesia.
The inquiry from Ethiopian Airlines would prove chillingly prescient because just months later one of its 737s would go down because of a flight control malfunction similar to the one that led to the Lion Air crash. The Ethiopian Airlines crash would kill everyone on board and leave questions about whether Boeing had done everything it could to inform pilots of what it had learned about the malfunction and how to handle it.
In response to the inquiry from Ethiopian Airlines, Boeing’s chief pilot, Jim Webb, proposed to his colleagues that he thank the airline for attending a previous briefing on the flight control system, called MCAS, but otherwise decline to answer the pilot’s first two questions and just refer the airline to training materials and previously issued guidance. Most of those on the email agreed.
But at least one Boeing official, Simon Lie, an expert on the protocols surrounding investigations who has since left the company, argued that it could answer the question that was most centered on flight safety.
“I’m good too. Although I think you could also answer question 2 without afoul of the investigation,” Lie, then a senior investigator for Boeing Commercial Airplanes who was part of the team looking into the Lion Air crash, wrote in the email, the contents of which were disclosed to a New York Times reporter. “However, if other feel we should stay away from 2, I will defer to their judgment.”
That question asked Boeing what to prioritize in the event of multiple emergencies involving MCAS. Such emergencies could overwhelm pilots with caution lights, loud sounds and seemingly conflicting warnings.
When the reply was sent back to the pilot the next day, Boeing did not answer that question, the email indicates.
“I can only address the current system and the Operations Manual Bulletin,” Webb wrote Ethiopian Airlines. “The first two questions directly relate to the accident scenario; therefore, I will be unable to address them here.”
Webb ended the email by stating that if airline officials had any additional questions about the bulletin and system, they should feel free to reach out.
While the existence of the inquiry from Ethiopian Airlines and the generalities of Boeing’s response were previously reported by the Times, the internal correspondence on how the decision was reached had not been made public.
Boeing previously said in interviews with the Times that its cursory response to Ethiopian Airlines was because it was prohibited by an international protocol from giving additional information while providing technical support to Indonesian authorities investigating the Lion Air crash. The protocol, known as Annex 13, governs crash investigations and was established by the International Civil Aviation Organization, a United Nations agency. The protocol is designed to encourage thoroughness by not emphasizing blame.
But the correspondence from Lie — who co-founded an aviation safety and investigation consulting company called Annex 13 Research after leaving Boeing — to his colleagues indicates that he did not view the restriction as all-encompassing.
It is impossible to know whether any pilots with Ethiopian Arlines would have acted differently if Webb’s reply had been more forthcoming. But Boeing’s limited response to an airline seeking help highlights a missed opportunity to collaborate on safety and to pass along lessons Boeing had collected following the Lion Air jet’s crash into the Java Sea on Oct. 29, 2018.
Then on March 10, 2019, an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Investigators in the United States and abroad found that a malfunction in the MCAS was — as in the Lion Air crash — a critical factor, and the lack of information from Boeing likely hindered the pilots’ response.
A Boeing spokesperson said in a statement that the company “cooperated fully and transparently with all investigations into the accidents. We’ll refer you to investigative agencies and reports for more information.”
In an email after this article was published, the spokesperson added that the company had provided information to address MCAS malfunction to all 737 Max operators in November 2018, including Ethiopian Airlines. That information was provided through various channels, including operations manual bulletins and dedicated meetings and emails on the subject.
Paul G. Cassell, a lawyer representing some of the families of victims of the crashes, said the email response from Lie clearly reveals a false justification used by Boeing to evade direct questions from Ethiopian Airlines.
“The emails show Boeing searching for any excuse, no matter how ridiculous, to avoid answering direct questions about the capabilities of the MCAS system,” Cassell said.
Lie declined an interview request with the Times. Boeing declined to make Webb available for an interview.
Boeing’s reply to Ethiopian Airlines stands in contrast to how the company responded to American-based companies around that time.
Following the Lion Air disaster, Boeing took proactive steps to brief U.S. pilots on the MCAS, which stands for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Domestic airlines received comprehensive insights into the system’s operations and its interaction with key flight data. Boeing’s conversations with domestic airlines emphasized the need for detailed knowledge of the behavior of the MCAS over reliance on standard checklists.
The disparity in information provided to U.S. and Ethiopian pilots raises pressing questions about the adequacy of training and the responsibility of manufacturers in ensuring the safety of all flight crews. Tewolde Gebremariam, the former CEO of Ethiopian Airlines, recalled in a recent interview with the Times that he and the other pilots had been frustrated with Webb’s response.
He said that the airline’s leadership and its pilots felt Boeing was being “defensive” and “unwilling to share the information” that Ethiopian Airlines needed to learn from the Lion Air crash and prevent similar accidents.
Gebremariam stated that Boeing’s attitude did not change after the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
“We wanted to learn so that we save ourselves and our airline from similar accidents, but Boeing was not cooperative,” Gebremariam said. “They went on to attack and post the blame onto the two poor pilots who were dead and who couldn’t defend themselves.”
An Ethiopian government investigation later determined that better communication from Boeing could have changed the outcome.
New details regarding Boeing’s interactions with Ethiopian Airlines are emerging as a federal judge weighs a plea agreement between the company and the Justice Department, following the two crashes.
In July, the government determined that Boeing violated the terms of the 2021 agreement reached after the Max crashes, stating that the aircraft manufacturer failed to create and maintain a program to detect and prevent violations of U.S. anti-fraud laws. In light of this violation, the Justice Department reached a new agreement with Boeing, resulting in a criminal charge.
Under the plea terms, Boeing would admit to conspiring to defraud the Federal Aviation Administration regarding critical safety information related to the MCAS. The deal includes a potential fine of approximately $487 million and requires Boeing to invest at least $455 million in safety improvements over three years. However, the terms may allow the company to halve the fine based on previous payments.
Victims’ families have vocally opposed the agreement, arguing that it fails to hold Boeing executives accountable for their roles in the crashes.
While the Justice Department defends the plea as a fair compromise that promotes safety, families are calling for a public trial to fully investigate corporate negligence. The judge has yet to announce a timeline for a decision on the matter.
This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
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