The nation-state and the end of the Caliphate
Published: 05:10 PM,Oct 16,2024 | EDITED : 08:10 PM,Oct 16,2024
The modern Arab nation must move towards a vision of revival that fosters unity and avoids sectarianism.
The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1922 marked the end of the Caliphate and the beginning of the nation-state era. The concept of the modern state, particularly in its territorial, national, and contractual sense, crystallised in the West following the Enlightenment. This development surpassed what Andreu Vincent outlined in his book Theories of the State, which described a belief that 'authority was derived from God, vested in the church and clergy as the spiritual entity above civil authority.'
In this framework, not only did religious authority outrank civil power, but the church and Christianity were synonymous with citizenship. Politics was an extension of theology, allowing the clergy to enjoy privileges, and the Pope to be viewed as both spiritual and temporal ruler.
Similarly, in the Islamic world, the Caliphate and the Imamate were also intertwined with divine authority. The Caliph was considered 'the shadow of God on earth,' while the jurist was seen as a representative signing on behalf of God Almighty.
Early critiques of this traditional structure emerged, notably by Ali Abdul Raziq in his 1925 work 'Islam and the Principles of Government.' Abdul Raziq argued that 'Muhammad (PBUH) was a messenger of a purely religious mission, untainted by ambitions of kingship or governance. He was not a king, nor the founder of a state, but merely a prophet like his fellow messengers.'
However, despite the emergence of national states, such bold discussions did not gain widespread traction in the Arab and Islamic world, largely due to the fear of religious backlash and its impact on political and social matters. Nonetheless, certain discussions about governance and the state did arise.
In the first half of the 20th century, colonialism united various ideological movements, and Islamists found common ground with leftists and socialists. Islamic writings at the time reflected socialist sentiments, as seen in works like Social Solidarity in Islam by Muhammad Abu Zahra, Socialism in Islam by Mustafa al Sibai, Social Justice in Islam by Sayyid Qutb, and From Here We Begin by Khalid Muhammad Khalid. Ali Shariati even considered Abu Dharr, a companion of the Prophet, to be the first socialist in Islam.
The Caliphate theory persisted within Islamic movements but became more open to secular methods in practice, though sovereignty remained rooted in the Islamisation of governance, as proposed by Abu Al A’la Al Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb.
Later, a faction of the Salafi movement declared the civil state apostate for reasons such as the suspension of Sharia, the persecution of Islamists, and the state's proximity to non-Muslims.
In contrast, leftist and nationalist movements, particularly in the first half of the 20th century, were more advanced in their vision for the civil state, focusing on modernising education, health, and agriculture. Despite this, leftist movements in the Arab world failed to deliver in practical terms. After a century since the fall of the Caliphate, no cohesive national project has emerged, nor has there been a unified spirit of national revival in the Arab world. Sectarian and civil conflicts, alongside issues like poverty, unemployment, and weakness in governance, continue to plague the region.
At the turn of the 21st century, critical re-evaluations of the state became more prominent, offering perspectives on citizenship and governance. To achieve meaningful progress, we must differentiate between revivalist thought and self-serving intervention, and between historical governance models and the contemporary nation-state.
The modern Arab nation must move towards a vision of revival that fosters unity and avoids sectarianism.
Regarding governance, past circumstances differ from those of the present. The values of justice and equality should now guide governance, rather than metaphysical concerns or ideological disputes, as noted by Hussein Al Khashen, who argued that the Prophet’s rulings as a leader were circumstantial rather than eternal.
This also applies to the concept of the comprehensive national state versus the contractual state. Whether monarchies or republics, Arab and Islamic nations must adopt a contractual approach to limit tyranny, foster internal cooperation, and promote national revival. A true renaissance requires the participation and respect of all citizens.
Translated by Badr al Dhafari (The original version of this article was published in Arabic in the print edition of Oman newspaper on October 16)
In this framework, not only did religious authority outrank civil power, but the church and Christianity were synonymous with citizenship. Politics was an extension of theology, allowing the clergy to enjoy privileges, and the Pope to be viewed as both spiritual and temporal ruler.
Similarly, in the Islamic world, the Caliphate and the Imamate were also intertwined with divine authority. The Caliph was considered 'the shadow of God on earth,' while the jurist was seen as a representative signing on behalf of God Almighty.
Early critiques of this traditional structure emerged, notably by Ali Abdul Raziq in his 1925 work 'Islam and the Principles of Government.' Abdul Raziq argued that 'Muhammad (PBUH) was a messenger of a purely religious mission, untainted by ambitions of kingship or governance. He was not a king, nor the founder of a state, but merely a prophet like his fellow messengers.'
However, despite the emergence of national states, such bold discussions did not gain widespread traction in the Arab and Islamic world, largely due to the fear of religious backlash and its impact on political and social matters. Nonetheless, certain discussions about governance and the state did arise.
In the first half of the 20th century, colonialism united various ideological movements, and Islamists found common ground with leftists and socialists. Islamic writings at the time reflected socialist sentiments, as seen in works like Social Solidarity in Islam by Muhammad Abu Zahra, Socialism in Islam by Mustafa al Sibai, Social Justice in Islam by Sayyid Qutb, and From Here We Begin by Khalid Muhammad Khalid. Ali Shariati even considered Abu Dharr, a companion of the Prophet, to be the first socialist in Islam.
The Caliphate theory persisted within Islamic movements but became more open to secular methods in practice, though sovereignty remained rooted in the Islamisation of governance, as proposed by Abu Al A’la Al Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb.
Later, a faction of the Salafi movement declared the civil state apostate for reasons such as the suspension of Sharia, the persecution of Islamists, and the state's proximity to non-Muslims.
In contrast, leftist and nationalist movements, particularly in the first half of the 20th century, were more advanced in their vision for the civil state, focusing on modernising education, health, and agriculture. Despite this, leftist movements in the Arab world failed to deliver in practical terms. After a century since the fall of the Caliphate, no cohesive national project has emerged, nor has there been a unified spirit of national revival in the Arab world. Sectarian and civil conflicts, alongside issues like poverty, unemployment, and weakness in governance, continue to plague the region.
At the turn of the 21st century, critical re-evaluations of the state became more prominent, offering perspectives on citizenship and governance. To achieve meaningful progress, we must differentiate between revivalist thought and self-serving intervention, and between historical governance models and the contemporary nation-state.
The modern Arab nation must move towards a vision of revival that fosters unity and avoids sectarianism.
Regarding governance, past circumstances differ from those of the present. The values of justice and equality should now guide governance, rather than metaphysical concerns or ideological disputes, as noted by Hussein Al Khashen, who argued that the Prophet’s rulings as a leader were circumstantial rather than eternal.
This also applies to the concept of the comprehensive national state versus the contractual state. Whether monarchies or republics, Arab and Islamic nations must adopt a contractual approach to limit tyranny, foster internal cooperation, and promote national revival. A true renaissance requires the participation and respect of all citizens.
Translated by Badr al Dhafari (The original version of this article was published in Arabic in the print edition of Oman newspaper on October 16)