Taliban return poses challenge for Indian diplomacy
Published: 03:10 PM,Oct 10,2021 | EDITED : 07:10 PM,Oct 10,2021
In the weeks since the Taliban’s returned to power in Kabul, the people of Afghanistan, particularly its women and girls, have been subjected to unimaginable suffering as the world’s attention turns to other issues. But many other countries, and especially India, have reason to worry.
The Taliban’s victory, following 20 years of unsuccessful American-led “nation-building” efforts in Afghanistan, will not only greatly embolden their fellow fighters, but will also shake up the region’s geopolitics. For evidence of the destabilising impact of Kabul’s fall, just look at the reactions of Afghanistan’s neighbours.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s response — notably his statement that the Taliban’s return to power was akin to throwing off “the shackles of slavery”.
This time, Pakistan’s influence is supposedly a little less absolute, but that did not prevent ISI chief Faiz Hameed from travelling to Kabul soon after its fall to preside triumphantly over the formation of the new Taliban government.
Less overtly but arguably more importantly, China has been working to make the best of a delicate situation. The Chinese have invested $62 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the single largest project of its transnational Belt and Road Initiative, and are anxious that Taliban do not jeopardise it. Significantly, Foreign Minister Wang Yi formally received a Taliban delegation in July.
With economic and strategic gains ripe for the taking, China has announced that it will do business with the Taliban. It is seeking to tap Afghanistan’s considerable underexploited mineral resources, especially rare earths, and reopen the Mes Aynak copper mine. There is even talk of extending the CPEC to Afghanistan.
The warm overtures appear to be mutual, with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s new first deputy prime minister, calling China a “trustworthy friend,” despite its systematic persecution of its own minority population. China’s priority vis-à-vis Afghanistan is to ensure that the Taliban offer neither support nor refuge to Uyghurs, and do nothing to disturb the functioning of the CPEC. With the Taliban government desperately in need of patronage — 80 per cent of the previous Afghan government’s $5.5 billion budget was financed by external assistance — China seems ideally suited to fill the breach.
These regional dynamics, with Pakistan and China becoming increasingly close, should be of enormous concern to Indian policymakers.
The last time the Taliban were in power, India made common cause with Russia and Iran in actively supporting the Panjshir Valley insurgency of the Northern Alliance under the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. This time, however, an increasingly pro-Chinese Russia has taken a neutral stance on Afghanistan’s issues with India.
India has invested $3 billion in Afghanistan — in dams, highways, electricity grids, hospitals, schools, and even the parliament building. With all this now in Taliban hands, Indian policymakers may be forgiven for feeling despondent. The Quad partnership strengthens India’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. But the main security threats to the country are on its land borders with China and Pakistan, where the Quad is unlikely to be of much use.
India now has a Taliban regime to its northwest, a nuclear-armed state to its west, and a hostile superpower to its northeast, and it faces ongoing threats to its territorial integrity. In this environment, maintaining national security and regional stability will pose an unprecedented challenge for Indian diplomacy in the months and years ahead.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021
The Taliban’s victory, following 20 years of unsuccessful American-led “nation-building” efforts in Afghanistan, will not only greatly embolden their fellow fighters, but will also shake up the region’s geopolitics. For evidence of the destabilising impact of Kabul’s fall, just look at the reactions of Afghanistan’s neighbours.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s response — notably his statement that the Taliban’s return to power was akin to throwing off “the shackles of slavery”.
This time, Pakistan’s influence is supposedly a little less absolute, but that did not prevent ISI chief Faiz Hameed from travelling to Kabul soon after its fall to preside triumphantly over the formation of the new Taliban government.
Less overtly but arguably more importantly, China has been working to make the best of a delicate situation. The Chinese have invested $62 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the single largest project of its transnational Belt and Road Initiative, and are anxious that Taliban do not jeopardise it. Significantly, Foreign Minister Wang Yi formally received a Taliban delegation in July.
With economic and strategic gains ripe for the taking, China has announced that it will do business with the Taliban. It is seeking to tap Afghanistan’s considerable underexploited mineral resources, especially rare earths, and reopen the Mes Aynak copper mine. There is even talk of extending the CPEC to Afghanistan.
The warm overtures appear to be mutual, with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s new first deputy prime minister, calling China a “trustworthy friend,” despite its systematic persecution of its own minority population. China’s priority vis-à-vis Afghanistan is to ensure that the Taliban offer neither support nor refuge to Uyghurs, and do nothing to disturb the functioning of the CPEC. With the Taliban government desperately in need of patronage — 80 per cent of the previous Afghan government’s $5.5 billion budget was financed by external assistance — China seems ideally suited to fill the breach.
These regional dynamics, with Pakistan and China becoming increasingly close, should be of enormous concern to Indian policymakers.
The last time the Taliban were in power, India made common cause with Russia and Iran in actively supporting the Panjshir Valley insurgency of the Northern Alliance under the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. This time, however, an increasingly pro-Chinese Russia has taken a neutral stance on Afghanistan’s issues with India.
India has invested $3 billion in Afghanistan — in dams, highways, electricity grids, hospitals, schools, and even the parliament building. With all this now in Taliban hands, Indian policymakers may be forgiven for feeling despondent. The Quad partnership strengthens India’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. But the main security threats to the country are on its land borders with China and Pakistan, where the Quad is unlikely to be of much use.
India now has a Taliban regime to its northwest, a nuclear-armed state to its west, and a hostile superpower to its northeast, and it faces ongoing threats to its territorial integrity. In this environment, maintaining national security and regional stability will pose an unprecedented challenge for Indian diplomacy in the months and years ahead.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021