IJSRD - International Journal for Scientific Research & Development| Vol.

3, Issue 08, 2015 | ISSN (online): 2321-0613

A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
Kurhade Supriya B.1 Palwe Chaitali B.2 Pande Priyanka R.3
Department of Computer Engineering
JCOE, Kuran
Abstract—The number of users of VoIP services is
increasing every year. Basically, VoIP systems are more
attractive for attackers. This paper describes the
implementation of a low interaction honeypot for
monitoring illegal activities in VoIP environments. The
honeypot operated during 92 days and collected 3502 events
related to the SIP protocol. The analysis of the results allows
understanding the modus operandi of the attacks targeted to
VoIP infrastructures. These results may be used to improve
defence mechanisms like firewalls and intrusion detection
systems. SIP is one of the major VoIP protocols and has its
architecture composed of four basic elements: user agent,
SIP proxy, redirect server and registry server. The user agent
(UA) is a logical function that matches the architecture of
the client. It is responsible for initiating or replying to SIP
transactions and can act as both client (UAC) and as a server
(UAS), starting SIP requests and SIP responses accepting, or
accepting SIP requests and answering them, respectively.
There are few implementations on VoIP security and attacks
in real-world VoIP systems. Some of them propose the use
of honeypots to catch malicious traffic in a VoIP
environment. Honeypots can be defined as a computational
resource to be probed, attacked and / or compromised,
whose value lies precisely in the unauthorized or illegal use
of the resources offered.
Key words: VOIP, Honeypot
Currently the telecommunications universe is undergoing a
transformation, with migration increasingly constant voice
communication via IP network, also known as VoIP. This
migration provides users a variety of new services and
facilities. In the case of VoIP communications one of the
main difficulties are related to security, with new attacks
aimed at compromising a production environment. A system
that suffered before, mostly with attack on physical
infrastructure, will now take all threats directed to the
protocol stack TCP / IP Come too specific attacks targeted
at voice protocols such as SIP (Session Initiation Protocol),
IAX (Intra-Asterisk Exchange) and RTP (Real-time
Transport Protocol), among others.
SIP is one of the major VoIP protocols and has its
architecture composed of four basic elements: user agent,
SIP proxy, redirect server and registry server. The user agent
or user agent (UA) is a logical function that matches the
architecture of the client. Responsible for initiating or
replying to SIP transactions, can act as both client (UAC)
and as a server (UAS), starting SIP requests and SIP
responses accepting, or accepting SIP requests and
answering them, respectively.
Responsible for routing function in a SIP network,
the SIP proxy is intended route the SIP requests and
responses between the devices involved, for the purpose of
completing calls from UAC. The redirect server aims to
redirect requests and responses based on SIP messages from
class 300, directing the UAC to direct contact to the

requested destination. But the registration server is
responsible for registering information on any UA that has
already logged on to the system. As well as the development
of other security component technology was not developed
with the same efficiency and speed dedicated to the delivery
of applications and the provision of the service.
Consequently a variety of attacks on these systems have
emerged (e.g. Call tracking, information leakage, call
handling, injection control codes). Despite having some
knowledge of these attacks, it is not possible to gather
consistent and reliable information about the method, tools
and motivations that lead attackers to execute them.
Threats to VoIP environments security comprise the whole
of the problems faced by data networks, more specific
problems of integrated protocols and services to a VoIP
infrastructure [7]. With respect to threats intended for
environments with VoIP infrastructure, there are various
ways to categorize them. A possible taxonomy is given in
[2] and classifies the attacks as threats to the availability,
confidentiality, integrity and against the social context.
A. Threats against Availability:
Threats to the availability of communications are aimed at
stopping the VoIP service are the type denial of service
attacks (DoS - Denial of Service)., Whose main objective to
make attacks on key elements of a VoIP communication
system as proxy , gateway or client. The call attack flooding
or flood calls, happens when an attacker aims to
significantly reduce the performance of a system, either
through the memory consumption, CPU or bandwidth, or
even disable it. This attack can occur in a unified way, that
is, from a single header, or distributed manner using botnet
or coordinated attacks.
Another attack are the malformed messages. For
this type of attack there are two ways to proceed. The first is
to change the structure of a SIP message. The other is to
maintain the regulated structure and then modify the default
message content. The impacts to infrastructure can be
infinite looping, buffer overflow, system failure, inability to
process genuine messages, among others [2]. The call
hijacking, or called sequestration, usually happens due to
flaws in the authentication process between the parties
involved in a VoIP communication. This is because the only
user authentication by the server is commonly realized. The
reverse process does not apply, allowing attackers through
the man-in-middle attack if pass for legitimate servers.
B. Threats against Confidentiality:
The threats against the confidentiality cause no direct impact
on communication between users, but can cause irreparable
damage, considering that sensitive information can be
intercepted and used for illicit purposes. The eavesdroping
aims to gain access to calls in transit between users of a
VoIP environment. Unlike difficulties to intercept a phone
call on the PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network),

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A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
(IJSRD/Vol. 3/Issue 08/2015/189)

VoIP environments this attack is very easy to perform,
making If a frequent and popular threat [2], [7]. Attacks
aimed at identity theft and passwords, are generally
composed of a number of other attacks.
Initially, using a process of enumeration, the
attacker performs a scan in the log server for Call-ID (user
ID) valid fingerprints of devices and ports used, among
others. Through improper access to control information
easily obtained through an interception attack, an attacker
can gain unauthorized access to identifiers that can provide
information on destination/origin of calls, duration, content,
registration servers, proxy gateways, among others.
C. Threats to Integrity:
The main objective of this type of threat is to commit
connections in progress. This can be done by tampering
signaling messages or else injection, substitution or deletion
of information transmitted. Call forwarding is one of these
attacks; can be any method or unauthorized attempt to
redirect IP or a control message, in order to divert a call.
The insertion and degradation of data from a VoIP
communication can be made through sniffers tools, of the
type attack man-in-the-middle, among others.
D. Threats against the Social Context:
Also categorized as social threats such threats have a
different approach from the others. This because they lack
technical nature, but rather on manipulating information in
order to transform the attacking figure in an entity integrates
and reliable. The misrepresentation or misrepresentation,
refers to the act of providing false information to third
parties as if they were true to a user or system can be duped
Spam over IP Telephony (SPIT) is similar to the
classic of spam emails. The spam over IP telephony is
defined as the mass requests attempts set in order to
establish a voice communication session or video [2]. When
a victim answers the call or the call is forwarded to a voice
mail, the spammer starts transmitting the message in real
time. The vishing (phishing VoIP) is supported by other
attacks and threats such as SPIT, misrepresentation of
identity, content and authority. As in phishing, is to obtain
personal information through illegal attempts usually
confidential, the system users. The difference lies in the fact
that vishing happens usually through voice calls or instant
E. Related Work:
In order to better understand the threats that surround this
environment, the use of honeypots has been proposed in
recent years. In [7] the authors present a holistic approach to
a system of detection and intrusion prevention, combining
the use of a high-interaction honeypot VoIP and event
correlation application layer SIP-based services. The
architecture could use to detect multiple types of attacks
such as DDoS, TIPS, among others.
The work done in [4] the authors present an
implementation of the VoIP honeypot Artemis. The authors
apply the honeypot in order to mitigate attacks as
enumeration and SPIT and implement controls as collection
devices vulnerable signatures and real-time control of
security mechanisms. Developed to work exclusively in
VoIP environments as a back-end user-agent, Artemis is a

honeypot for the purpose of detecting malicious activity
intended for this type of infrastructure, at an early stage.
Real attack data collections are not made.
In [5] the authors describe a solution architecture
deployed to intercept, analyze and report VoIP attacks. The
presented solution implements a honeynet, based solely on
the use of free software and systems like Asterisk PBX. The
proposed architecture provides emulated services to
attackers, ie, high-interaction honeypots are used to
implement various real services in VoIP environments, in
order to attract the largest number of possible attackers.
In [6] the same authors perform a VoIP system
security assessment, based on analysis of information
generated through the implementation of the honeynet from
previous work [5]. The authors explain how the
infrastructure of the honeynet was deployed and the analysis
and evaluations of attacks suffered. In [8] and [9] the
authors propose a VoIP honeypot that modifies the modus
operandi of their implementation whenever it is necessary,
in order to circumvent the maximum activity of an offender.
The implementation of the project took place from the
installation and configuration of the honeypot low
interactivity Dionaea [15]. The choice of this honeypot gave
up due to its easy installation, configuration and
maintenance, and can be implemented without major
difficulties in a network. The server on which the honeypot
was installed has the following settings:
 Processor: Intel (R) Core (TM) 2 Quad CPU Q9400 @
 RAM: 1 GB
 Operating System: GNU / Linux Ubuntu LTS 12:04:01
 Hard Drive: 80 GB
The honeypot was configured to be capable of
emulating a SIP network, offering features such as
components, services and SIP users. In addition, the
honeypot has been configured with other services such as,
ftp, http, mysql, among others, who served as bait for
potential attackers to set up infrastructure. The honeypot is
connected to the Internet via a dedicated connection of 1
Mbps, through which should be captured malicious
activities transmitted on real traffic.
When called the software registers two important
directories. The first is the / dionaea / etc /, where is located
the dionaea.conf file,file that records all system settings. The
second of them is / dionaea / var / directory, where are
stored log files, other directories responsible for storing the
data recorded by the honeypot and logsql.sqlite database
file, responsible for the registration of all shares registered
by the honeypot .
Subdirectories mentioned is important to highlight:
/ dionaea / var / binaries, where they recorded the binary
malicious artifacts that were captured by the system; /
dionaea / var / bistreams, responsible for registering the
actions of the attackers on the honeypot and / dionaea / var /
RTP, where the files relating to attempts to carry out
fraudulent calls via SIP service (Fig. 1) is stored.
The honeypot was tested for robustness and
accuracy. The purpose of these tests was to verify if the
software deployed properly perform their tasks, such as
capturing the attacks and storage of information in the

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A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
(IJSRD/Vol. 3/Issue 08/2015/189)

database. For this, they used network verification tools and
simulation of traffic, such as SIPp and SIPScan. To test the
robustness were generated approximately 50 simultaneous
connections to the honeypot, which were sent through
separate 100 messages per connection. In this way it was
possible to verify the correct functioning of the honeypot
even when subjected to a high amount of activity. The
honeypot properly captured all the traffic generated and can
then be operated to capture actual attacks.

generally recipient has moved from its original
location either temporarily or permanently.
3) Registrar: one of the vital jobs of the servers is to
detect the location of a user within a network. User
refreshes their location time to time by registering to a
registrar server.
4) Location server: The address register in registrar server
is stored in a location server.

VoIP is a wide technology that allows telephone calls to be
made over computer networks like the Internet system. VoIP
converts analog voice signals into digital data packets and
supports real-time and multi transmission of conversations
using Internet Protocol. VoIP calls can be made on the
Internet by using a VoIP Service Provider and standard
computer audio systems. Alternatively, some service
providers support VoIP through ordinary telephones that use
special adapters to connect to home computer network.
Many VoIP implementations are based on the H.323
technology standard. VoIP offers an efficient cost savings
over traditional long distance telephone calls. VoIP phone
service may be less secure than ordinary phone service.
Traditional phone lines can be wiretapped, but this requires
communications, on the other hand, can be investigated over
the Internet electronically. Likewise, network attackers can
interrupt your calls by interfering with the flow of data
We have introduced certain terminologies in the description
of our models and for designing the VoIp architecture. The
SIP network uses the components:
Entities interacting in a SIP scenario are called
User Agents. User agents may operate in two way:
 User Agent Client (UAC)-It generate requests and
send that requests to servers.
 User Agent Server (UAS)-It gets that requests,
Processes on that request and generate responses.

There are number of entities involve in VoIP system. User
(sender and receiver) is usually authorised by SIP manager.
Firstly, user sends credential for registration to SIP manager
.Then SIP manger generates a SIP ID for each user to login
the system. In this system only two authorized user can
communicate to each other. When any user wants to send a
message or want to communicate to other user, then it
simply sends a request for connection. The proxy server
accepts the request from the sender and forward it to SIP
manager for checking authority of user. SIP manager have
the database for user information, it also checks the user
credential and sends response to server. If the authorized
user is present then request is forwarded to the destination
user otherwise request is not forwarded to destination.
If there is an attacker which want to hack the
system or hijack the system. It sends the request for
connection. At that time SIP manager checks the
authentication of user and sends negative response to server.
Server drops the call and save information of attacker in
system like location, IP address etc. The security provided
by honeypot for observing the traffic in network and detect
the attacker. Honeypot uses to manage the traffic and
provide security to user side data or information.

A. Client:
In general we associate the knowledge of clients to the end
user that is running on the system used by users.it may be
softphones running on PC’s or messaging device in IP
phones. It generates a request when you try to call another
person within a network and sends the request to a server.
B. Servers:
Servers are generally part of the network. They acquire a
predefined set of rules to handle the requests sent by clients.
There are several types of server:
1) SIP proxy server: This is most common type of server
in a SIP environment. When request is generated by
client, the exact address of the receiver is not known in
previously. So, the client sends the request to a proxy
server. The server on behalf of the client forwards the
request to another proxy server or the recipient.
2) Redirect server: Redirect server redirects clients
requests, to indicate that clients needs to choose
different route to get the recipient.it happens when

Fig. 1: System Architecture
In fig1 there are two authorized users which can
communicate to each other but the third entity called
attacker can’t communicate to any user which is authorized
by SIP. SIP manager detect the attacker and break the call as
well as it store the information about attacker in backend. In
this system the user use the smart phones, laptops, tabs,
analogue phones personal computers etc for communication.
Each user has unique username and password for login the
A. Registration and Authentication
In VoIP system user need to create an account with SIP
manager using a unique identification criteria. Such a

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A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
(IJSRD/Vol. 3/Issue 08/2015/189)

system can include the IP address of user system, mobile
number, location base information, user profile etc. Which
unambiguously identifies the system or person. While
setting up an account, SIP manager generate an SIP ID for
each user, which is later used as login credentials for all
users. SIP manger generate the SIP ID like email address for
eg. If user is bob it send the credential for registration like
user name, address, IP address of the systemic. Then SIP
manager generate SIP ID like bob123@somewhere.com
using this SIP ID bob login the system for communication.
B. Session Initiation Protocol
Session Initiation Protocol is the protocols used for setting
up VoIP calls and is the crux of the IPTS. It is authority for
initializing, modifying and tearing down sessions. The
addressing for this sessions are based on Uniform Resource
Identifiers of the involved parties and not the terminals that
they are using SIP.SIP is the text based application layer
protocol. Its syntax is similar to the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol. It does not serve as a media gateway and it is
solely responsible for the session setup/tear-down signalling.
SIP doesn't define the media transfer protocol and it can be
used over either TCP or UDP, and by default uses port
number 5060. The parallaly of SIP to HTTP allows
compatibility with web browser. The SIP message can be of
any format, various types of information may be transmitted
through SIP. It allow to contain messages from other
protocols such as Real Time Protocol, Session Description
Protocol, Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) and Real
Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP).
SIP is decision making for determining the location
of the end point to be used based on the Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URI), with the help of a DNS server or
intermediary proxies. Availability of users and their
willingness to authorize the communication link is
negotiated before a call is authorized and prior to the flow of
information, Call initiations, holds, transfers, session
termination are managed by SIP. A SIP server accepts
requests from a User Agent Client and sends back
responses. The server act as a proxy server, in which case it
can act as a client and it forward requests to another server
on behalf of a client. The server also works as a registrar,
accepting checking, and REGISTER requests if the UAC is
authorized to register with the network. The users can only
make a call through a SIP proxy if user is registered. The
SIP Proxy server forms a triangular topology with the client
and user agent server. The proxy server receives requests
from the User agent client (UAC), and decides where to
forward that request. It may either forward it to User Agent
Server or to another proxy. The response follows the same
path in reverse. If the server finds multiple destinations for
the requests, it can create the request and send it to all of
C. VoIP Conversation using SIP
The caller sends an INVITE message to the callee to initiate
a multimedia session, for example a VoIP call. The callee
may be answer with a “180 Ringing” message (provisional)
and it must answer with a “200 OK” or error message. If
there is no answer from the callee, the INVITE request will
eventually time out. In order to tell the other party the
specifications of the multimedia stream that will carry the

actual voice signals, the caller has to embed an SDP
message inside the SIP message’s body.

Fig. 2: VoIP conversation using SIP
He will also get an SDP message with parameters
for the RTP stream from the callee. After the successful start
of a session the media such as VoIP audio is sent using the
Real-time Transport Protocol. The messages transmitted by
each party in a typical VoIP session using SIP are shown in
A list of the most important, and often mandatory,
SIP headers:

Some headers contain a random string that is used
for identification purposes. Even though these additional
random parameters are essential parts of the SIP
specification, they are only discussed briefly because they
are generated and processed by the exiting VoIP software
used in this thesis. They do not play an important role in the
concept of the proposed security architecture to be described
in fig.
The additional random parameters are used to
uniquely and globally identify call relationships. They are
also important for detecting request loops in a network. For
instance, the from header is of the form
with NAME being the full name or an alias of the
person calling, EXTENSION being either the extension
number or the nickname the caller is registered under on the
VoIP server (given by SERVER), and RANDOM being a
random alphanumeric string set by the calling phone. The
To header can also contain such a random tag. The SIP
protocol specifies that the tag is only to be used in peer to

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A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
(IJSRD/Vol. 3/Issue 08/2015/189)

peer dialogues and that is SIP requests and according
Each request must contain one or more Via headers
which must have a branch parameter appended to the
address of the routing node. Therefore, a Via header is of the
with ADDRESS being the network address of the node that
forwarded and routed the request (including the original
sender) and RANDOM being the random alphanumeric
string that must always begin with the characters.
A. Hash and FNV Hash Algorithm:
Hashes are used to assign some form of identify to a piece
of information. The trick is that every time that information
is hashed, it results in the same intimation. This is useful for
tracking files to see if they've changed, or for using hash
tables to store large sets of data.
Hash tables are used to store in coming packets in
network. Some time there are traffic occurred in network
that’s effect on speed of data packets transmission and some
time there may be data packet losses. To avoiding this
problem we use algorithm. When traffic occurred in network
that time data packets are store in hash table and then one by
one send for destination. In this way we transfer the data
packets without any losses.
1) FNV-1 Algorithm:
 hash = offset_basis
 for each octet of data to be hashed
 hash = hash * FNV_prime
 hash = hash Xor octet of data
 return hash
In the above pseudo code, all variables are unsigned
integers. All variables, except for byte of data, have the
same number of bits as the FNV hash. A variable,
Byte_of_data, is an 8 bit unsigned integer.
As an example, consider the 64-bit FNV-1 hash:
 A variables, except for Byte_of_data, are 64-bit
unsigned integers.
 Many variable, Byte_of_data, is an 8 bit unsigned
 The
FNV_offset_basis value: 1469598103.
 The FNV_prime is the 64-bit FNV_prime value:
 The multiply returns the lower 64-bits of the
 The XOR is an 8-bit operation that change only the
lower 8-bits of the hash value.
 The hash value return is a 64-bit unsigned integer.
2) FNV-1a Algorithm:
FNV 1a is a minor variation of FNV hash algorithm. The
difference between the FNV1 and FNV 1a hash is the order
of the Xor and multiply. The FNV 1a hash uses the
FNV_prime and offset_basis.The FNV1 hash of the same nbit size.
 hash = offset_basis
 for each octet of data to be hashed
 hash = hash Xor octet of data

hash = hash * FNV_prime
return hash
The above pseudocode has the same assumptions
that were noted for the FNV-1 pseudocode. The minor
change in order leads to much better avalanche
B. Round Robin Algorithm:
Round robin is the scheduling algorithm used by the CPU
during execution of the process. Round robin is designed for
the time sharing systems. Round robin is similar to first
come first serve scheduling algorithm. A round robin is an
arrangement of choosing all the elements in a group in some
rational order. From top to bottom of the list and then
starting again at the top of the list. A small unit of time call
as time slice or quantum is set/defined. All processes in the
algorithm are kept in the circular queue called as ready
queue. Each New process is added to the tail of the circular
queue .Using this algorithm, CPU makes sure time slices are
assigned to each process in equal portions or in circular
order dealing with all process without any priority.
The number of users of VoIP services is increasing every
year. So, VoIP systems get more attractive for attackers.
Therefore we introduce the system detecting an attacker
using honeypot. Sometime data packets are loss during
transmission because of collision occurs within a network
.and this collision occurs by attacker to disturb the network.
System avoid that problem by using hash table as well as
handle the traffic and avoid data losses. The propose system
use in multiple applications like military communication,
VIP calls, Business related calls. Voice mail system. One of
the application is Skype for VOIP calling.
For example, There are two military officer and
they wants to communicate with each other on some
security issues. But sometime their may be third entity can
present called attacker.who trying to hack the data for illegal
use. To avoid this attacking we use our system. In this
system when two officer are communicate with each other
then attacker can’t hack the data because when attacker want
to attack on the system. At that time SIP manager check the
authentication of attacker and simply reject the connection
as well as it store the information of attacker.
As future work can be done deploying a honeynet with
sensors (honeypots) distributed geographically. This would
provide the necessary range to in full Were registered 23
different user-agents. However, it was found by analyzing
the recorded messages que some of these tools are variations
of SipVicious tool. It can see also native user-agents of
widespread softphone applications, such as eyeBeam, sipcli
And Also the Asterisk Open Source PBX in its different
versions and derivatives. Other tools originally developed
for use by network administrators Were Observed Also, the
sipsak and smap. The occurrence of unidentified user-agents
Refers to more sophisticated attacks, through the use of
more advanced tools.
The Obtained results allowed a more detailed look
at the development of attacks Aimed at VoIP environments.

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A Review on Detecting an Attackers in VOIP using Honeypot
(IJSRD/Vol. 3/Issue 08/2015/189)

This information can be used to feed the rules of other
security tools actions, such as firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. The information Obtained Also can be
used in the construction of blacklists and whitelists.
The research and implementations for this thesis
concentrate on protecting the customers and users of the
VoIP network. Parts of the infrastructure that are excluded
from the security architecture are:
1) The protection of VoIP backend servers, that is
proxies and registrars, however they might be used
for collection of data,
2) Any computers and devices that are not within the
protected network,
3) Physical security considerations, that is physical
access control or TEMPEST, and
4) Individual protection mechanisms such as antivirus products.
The number of solutions and users of VoIP systems have
increased in recent years. This tendency makes them more
attractive VoIP systems in the eyes of cybercriminals. This
article has shown deploying a honeypot for the study of
related attacks on the SIP protocol. It observed a series of
attacks aimed at VoIP infrastructure, from initial attacks, as
survey in search of SIP devices to attacks aimed at the total
commitment of the infrastructure. Overall, the results led to
a holistic view of the attacks carried out in the real world
and the detection of various attacks and tools used to
commit the attacks to the system can be concluded that there
is potential for real VoIP systems. This information can be
used to improve defense mechanisms and also help in
developing a security policy for VoIP systems.

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